It is comparatively simple to sketch an historical overview of the chemical industry in Europe and the United States across the twentieth century. The identification after 1900 of naturally occurring vitamins and hormones in the body, followed by the development of novel synthetic chemicals, set the stage for the development of the modern industry in the first few decades of the century. With expanded war production during World War I, the U.S. chemical industry began to catch up with the Europeans. In the interwar period, research quickened as novel synthetic compounds were developed for a variety of uses, including plastics, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals. Following World War II, production expanded dramatically using growing supplies of petroleum as a feedstock. This expanded industry finally aroused broad public and regulatory concerns that went beyond workplace hazards to include consumer exposures through pesticide residues, packaging materials, and food additives. 1 While the U.S. government had sought greater control of air and water pollution from factory emissions in the first three decades of the twentieth century, targeting the production of specific, harmful chemicals lagged, as the owners of chemical companies aggressively sought to limit regulation of their activities.
Sulfanilamide, that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was given the ability to regulate the safety of drugs. In addition to regulating drugs, the 1938 act banned poisonous substances from food. However, the new law incorporated industrial toxicology's belief that "the dose makes the poison" to the extent that it established a regulatory approach mandating acceptable tolerance levels for "unavoidable" poisonous substances in foods. The 1958 amendment to the law required premarket testing of medicines and new food additives, restricted unsafe levels of harmful chemicals, and banned carcinogens in food outright.
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Congressional hearings on the safety of new plastics, fertilizers and other chemicals led to the 1958 bill. Soon thereafter, publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) raised further concern with the health and environmental effects of chemicals. Still, U.S. chemical manufacturers were big business by this time, with sufficient power to resist new regulatory efforts. Moreover, provisions and applications of the 1958 bill were shaped by pressure from manufacturing associations, most notably in allowing use of chemicals known to be toxic under the assurance that safe levels of exposure could be established and regulated.
In this paper, I explore the following counterfactual question: could twentieth-century chemical synthesis and production have proceeded in a way that caused less damage to human health and the environment? The option of pursuing safer chemicals was precluded, in part, as the result of technical and regulatory assumptions that regulation could and should proceed by identifying safe and unsafe levels of chemicals, rather than distinguishing between safe and unsafe chemicals tout court. These industrial chemicals could have been developed with less harmful properties for physiological and ecological health, in particular as the result of adoption of a research program to design chemicals that were "benign by design" (in the words of contemporary "green chemists"
Paul Anastas and John Warner) rather than the path that firms and regulators chose: designing toxic chemicals with an eye to safe levels of use. for a more balanced perspective on historical contingency, one that highlights the role of historical contingency while also delineating how likely it was that alternative outcomes could have been sustained in practice.
Counterfactuals in the History of Technology
Could non-toxic, or less toxic, chemicals have been produced in the twentieth century? I aim to show that there existed developed, alternative approaches to understanding the safety of hazardous substances in a number of fields. These alternatives emphasized eliminating inherent toxic substances on the assumption that low levels of toxic substances likely remained harmful, a view called the per se standard. By contrast, the dominant approach sought to identify safe levels of any substance on the assumption that "the solution to pollution is dilution," a view called the de minimus standard. In essence, one could seek to distinguish toxic from benign substances, or one could identify safe and toxic levels of any substance.
The latter view won out, with partial exceptions to be discussed, but the arguments for the former were (and remain) compelling, so that understanding how a different outcome was possible is well supported by historical documentation. At the same time, science does not operate in isolation from larger societal forces. In the context of powerful institutional support for the toxicologists' de minimus standard, the postulation that the eclipsing of the per se standard was a near run thing within science must be supplemented by the recognition that an alternative scientific trajectory would not be sustainable without countervailing public pressure and alternative sources of financial support.
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Hindsight Bias and the Social Construction of Technology
Methodological developments on the use of counterfactuals in recent political history have tried to counter the "hindsight bias" identified by experimental psychologists. After the fact, political historians have tended to assume that outcomes that would have been seen as highly improbable before they occurred (rise of the West, negotiated settlement of the Cuban missile crisis, fall of the Soviet Union) are seen as inevitable after they happened. additive under the law. In effect, Heckman was able to turn the Delaney per se standard into a de minimus standard, while grandfathering chemicals already in use and streamlining the regulatory approval process. 23 The Manufacturing
Chemists' Association (MCA) and other manufacturing associations produced doubt about claims of harm under the guise of "trade association science," while corporate literature reviews in toxicology routinely ignored evidence of carcinogenicity. 24 Funded by industry and using experimental techniques that blocked consideration of low-level effects, toxicology could itself be seen as a scientific field captured by industry (call it "disciplinary capture").
The Fallout Debate and the Linear No-Threshold Model
During the height of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s, public debate on the effects of radioactive fallout informed debates about chemical toxicity as well. Rachel Carson drew on the invisible and insidious character of strontium-90, its bioaccumulation in the food chain, and public doubts about governmental forthrightness to frame her discussion of the dangers of pesticides. 25 Debate about whether nuclear fallout presented a real danger to the U.S. public split along disciplinary lines. Among geneticists, the idea that genetic damage from radiation increased linearly without a threshold (the Linear No-Threshold Model or LNT) dominated, while most physicians involved in the nuclear fallout debate held that low-level fallout was safe. 26 Physicians were concerned that public dissemination of the no-threshold model would cause public panic and make medical use of radiation impossible. Hermann Muller's demonstration in 1927 of radiation-induced genetic mutations led him to express caution on the use of X-rays for medical therapies and provided the foundation for the linear model. Since that time, geneticists have complained that the implications of the LNT model were ignored by medical practitioners and regulators. Just as with the study of carcinogens, studies of long-term chronic exposure to radiation were neglected in favor of focusing on acute effects.
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Evidence is strong of neglect and suppression of the geneticists' position, which called for a precautionary approach based upon emerging understanding of the role of radiation in inducing genetic damage (and possibly cancer).
Geneticists also recognized that scientific demonstration of the exact level of harm for human populations was not provable by current methods. Geneticists were largely excluded from the Manhattan Project's assessment of radiation risk, where physicians, physicists, and radiologists took a toxicological approach focused on immediate damage produced above a threshold. 28 The Manhattan , 7, 50, 217-41, 76-82. 28 Ibid., 229. 29 Ibid., [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [106] [107] Goffman, however, would go on to question publicly whether nuclear power was worth the risks.
Conclusion
37 Ibid., 297, 278; Walker, Permissible Dose, [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] Permissible Dose, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] Quoted in ibid., 49. See also Kathren, "Historical Development," 14, who notes that linear extrapolation "was really a statement of the upper level of risk in the low dose region of the dose-response curve-the very region of interest from a protection standpoint and the very region in which dose-response data were not available." 40 Walker, Permissible Dose, 50.
It is certainly possible that no-threshold approaches might be suitable for some areas of study, like carcinogenic chemicals and low-dose radiation, while being inappropriate for toxicology more generally. However, the way these arguments played out, different extrapolations from high-dose animal experiments reflected different political assumptions about risk. 41 Toxicology's emphasis on threshold harms was used as a shield to prevent further investigation of low-dose harms, as well as to focus attention on acute harms rather than long-term effects. The no-threshold approach was implemented in the Delaney amendment, but was quickly rendered moot by regulatory capture, as pressure from the chemical industry shaped the FDA's interpretation of the amendment.
The most significant outcome of the threshold model was that industrial chemicals, synthetic pesticides, and plastics used in consumer goods continued to be developed and manufactured even where evidence of toxicity existed. A further investigation of a second-order counterfactual would be necessary to judge the extent to which substitute chemicals or alternative manufacturing processes could have been found had regulatory intervention followed a more preemptive approach. Moreover, even given greater acceptance of the nothreshold approach within the scientific community, corporate pressure would likely have continued to prevent a significant shift in the type of chemicals manufactured, at least absent a larger environmental movement to challenge business as usual. What counterfactual analysis does reveal is that serious challenges to business as usual did occur. But those challenges were overwhelmed by the singular importance granted to industrial chemicals and pharmaceutical products under the reigning American political economy of the day. Lack of knowledge of harms alone did not result in the proliferation of toxic chemicals. That dangerous history resulted from the power of corporate interests in shaping the kinds of chemicals that would be developed, as well as the methods to evaluate and regulate their safety. 41 Proctor, Cancer Wars, ch. 7.
